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 needed, with improvemiient in the currency. It is possible that the
 system of taxation might be varied so as to provide for the provincial
 and municipal loans which were too readily granted; though prob-
 abilities disincline an observer to conclude that local taxation will be
 increased without great difficulty.
 Suggestions have been hazarded relative to foreign financial control.
 Foreign financial control may be needed, and may be possible in the
 case of a feeble or a decaying state. It is not possible in the case of a
 vigorous or a growing state, nor is it necessary. Material wealth
 exists and is developing. We may refer, confidently, to the words
 Don F. Seeber quotes of Dr. Avellaneda, ' We will suffer thirst and
 hunger rather than not pay our debts.'
 W. H. BISHOP
 URUGUAY-A FINANCIAL INCIDENT.
 THE exigencies of finance are sometimes-such as to call for sacrifices
 by investors. An instance of the sacrifice forced upon the public has
 lately come out in the form of a practically compulsory reduction of the
 interest of the debt of Uruguay. It will be remembered that when
 Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co. went into liquidation last November their
 assets were taken over by the Bank of England, which, in company
 with a number of other banks and bankers, guaranteed the creditors of
 that firm against loss. Among the assets of Messrs. Baring was a sum
 of two millions nominal of 6 per cent. bonds, issued by the Uruguayan
 Government, but never offered to the public, or marketed. The said
 6 per cents. seemed for some time to be little better than rubbish,
 seeing that Uruguay was in immediate risk of default, following upon
 the distress and incapacity of Argentina. The financiers who under-
 took the liquidation of Messrs. Baring's liabilities found it necessary to
 devise a plan for making these Uruguayan 6 per cents. marketable.
 They valued the said bonds at 50 per cent. of their face value. In
 other words, they reckoned upon getting one million sterling for the
 two millions nominal of Uruguayan bonds, which Messrs. Baring Bros.
 had bought wholesale from the Uruguayan Government. Unfortunately,
 these bonds were not of a piece with any bonds quoted on the Stock
 Exchange, or otherwise marketable. The financiers thereupon made
 proposals to Uruguay, the upshot of which was that the whole debt
 of Uruguay should be reduced from 5 per cent. to 31 per cent. in
 perpetuity, and that these Baring bonds should be "unified" with
 the rest, so providing an opportunity for floating off the unmarketable
 assets of the Baring estate. The objections to this scheme are obvious,
 sound, and, morally speaking, insuperable. Uruguay ought not to take
 advantage of the needs of a firm like Messrs. Baring to reduce the
 interest which it had solemnly engaged to pay to the holders of its
 bonds. By so doing, Uruguay ignores the mass of its creditors, and
 makes capital out of the temporary difficulties of the financial classes.
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 An honest debtor will pay all he can pay. This bargain offers the
 debtor an opportunity to shirk. The badness of the plan lies in its
 precedent. If adopted, we shall have every other unscrupulous state
 which finds itself in difficulties, or whose finance minister thinks that
 he can get popularity at home by fleecing the creditors who hold the
 bonds of his government, making some such arrangement. The Spanish
 precedent of 1881, when 3 per cents. of Spain were so converted and
 reduced as to yield 17 per cent. only, is the worst of all. Whether
 Uruguay will reap much benefit from the cutting down of interest
 remains to be seen. The chances are that it would have better con-
 sulted its own credit and interest generally if it paid as much as it
 could in the bad times, giving evidence of good faith and good intentions
 in the future by promising to resume the full rate on Uruguayan
 5 and 6 per cent. bonds, whenever its resources should permit. Men
 of business shrug their shoulders, and affirm that " half a loaf is better
 than no bread," and that is, perhaps, how the great financiers excuse
 their not very creditable action in the matter of Uruguay.
 A. ELLIS
 THE EVOLUTION OF OUR BANKING SYSTEM.
 THE financial disturbance which culminated on the 15th of Novem-
 ber, 1890, will probably pass into history as the Baring crisis. At the
 same time no more complete misnomer than the word ' crisis' could
 be applied to a condition of affairs in which the commercial public is
 content to surrender its critical faculties, and to be guided by the un-
 reasoning suggestions of fear and panic. But the word ' crisis' may
 with propriety be used to describe a movement in the banking
 system towards which events had evidently long been tending, which
 was distinctly accelerated by the catastrophe of November, and which,
 when it has spent its force, will probably be found to have established
 new relations between the banking comimunity and the public with
 which it deals, as the result of the considered judgment of both parties.
 It is, moreover, not impossible that these changed relations may entail
 changes of an economic nature in the general trade and commerce of
 the country.
 The ' Mystery of Modern Goldsmiths or Bankers' came gradually
 into being about the time of the Restoration, when the goldsmiths
 proper, who were also dealers in exchange, began to receive deposits of
 coin at interest from traders, merchants, and private persons. This
 new departure evoked no small a'mount of hostile criticism, and a
 cloud of pamphlets or tracts. The coin of the realm, said the critics,
 would, under the new departure, be collected from the pockets of the
 people into the chests of the goldsmiths; facilities would be given
 for lending large sums to reckless traders or spendthrift borrowers;
 the money required for the purposes of trade would thus be diverted
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